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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over the instant
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Jacobsen of the Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing to
request that prospective juror Progess be removed for cause or
failing to remove him by peremptory challenge. To make such a
showing, a defendant must show, first, that counsel rendered a
deficient performance, falling below an objective standard of
reasonable professional judgment, and, second, that counsel's
performance was prejudicial. Bundy v. Deland, 763 P. 2d 803 (Utah
1988). The appellate court reviews such a claim as a matter of law.
State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32 ^[20, 984 P.2d 376. Preservation of
Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: issues involving
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel constitute an exception to
the preservation rule and as such may be raised for the first time on
appeal.

2.

Whether the trial court committed plain error by not pursuing the
dismissal of prospective juror Progess similar to that of the other
prospective jurors. In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1993),
1

this Court outlined the following principles involved in determining
whether "plain error" exists:
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and
to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was
not properly objected to, the appellant must show the
following (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) The error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the
appellant, or phrased differently, or confidence in the
verdict is undermined.
Id. At 1208-09
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: Issues
involving plain error constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such
may be raised for the first time on appeal.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provision, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulation, or case
law whose interpretation is determinative, are set out verbatim, with the
appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant alleges this case involves the failure to remove a prospective
juror for cause or by peremptory challenge.

Appellant alleges these failures

precluded Defendant of the right to a fair trial.
Defendant was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a disable or Elder Adult
and Assault. He pleaded not guilty to the charges.
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Defendant subsequently appeared for a jury trial. At the conclusion of trial,
Defendant was convicted on both counts.
On that same day, the trial court sentenced Defendant as follows; Based on
the conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or Elder Adult, the trial court
sentenced Defendant to a term of 365 days in the Davis County Jail, of which it
suspended 325 days; and as to the conviction of Assault, the trial court sentenced
Defendant to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court
suspended. Defendant thereafter filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Mr. Jacobsen was charged with Abuse or Neglect of a Disabled or Elder
Adult in violation of Utah Code Ann § 76-5-111 (3) (a), a class A
misdemeanor, and Assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102, a
class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2).
2. On September 29, 2003, Mr. Jacobsen appeared before the district court
and pleaded not guilty (R. 10-11).
3. Mr. Jacobsen appeared for a jury trial on April 16, 2004 (R. 67-70).
4. During jury selection the trial court asked the prospective jurors whether
any of them have close friends or family members that work in law
enforcement (R. 117:18:19-20). Prospective juror John Richard Progess
responded that he had " close friend that's on the Utah Highway Patrol."
(R. 117:21:14-15).
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5. The trial court asked Mr. Progess if he would "be inclined to give more
credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed to a lay witness in
court." (R. 117:22:1-3). Mr. Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd
give more credibility, but I think they probably pay attention to detail a
little bit more than the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6).
6. The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the proceedings, would
your tendency be to favor the prosecution over the defense: (R.
117:22:7-8). Mr. Progess responded, "No." (R. 117:22:9).
7. The final six persons selected to sit on the jury included Mr. Progess (R.
117:39:14-16).
8. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. Jacobsen on both
counts. (R. 117:132:2-8).
9. That same day, the trial court imposed sentence. (R. 68). Based on the
conviction of Abuse or Neglect of a disabled or Elder Adult, the trial
court sentenced Mr. Jacobsen to a term of 365 days in the Davis County
Jail, of which it suspended 325 days. (R. 68). As to the conviction of
Assault, the trial court sentenced Mr. Jacobsen to a term of 180 days in
the Davis County Jail, which the trial court suspended. (R. 67-70).
10. Mr. Jacobsen filed a timely prose notice of appeal (R. 71).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. The Defendant Alleges that his Sixth Amendment right to the effective
assistance of counsel by failing to request that prospective juror Progess
4

be removed for cause of failing to remove him by peremptory
challenge.

The trial counsel's failure to request that Progess be

removed for cause or failing to remove him by peremptory challenge
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable professional
judgment.
Even with the removal of Progess the result at trial would not have been
different.
2. The trial court did not commit plain error by not pursuing the dismissal
of prospective juror Progess similar tot hat of the other prospective
jurors. The Trial court did not need to do further questioning of and
dismissal of prospective juror Progess even though the trial court
pursued such questioning of and dismissal of other prospective jurors.
Finally, there was no error found.

5

ARGUMENTS
I.

TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT DENY Mr. JACOBSEN OF HIS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST
THAT PROSEPECTIVE JUROR PROGESS BE DISMISSED
FOR CAUSE OR FOR FAILING TO REMOVE HIM BY
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE.

In order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show: (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient by
falling below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) trial
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant by depriving him
of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, (1984). If the
defendant fails to establish either of the two parts of the Strickland test,
counsel's assistance was constitutionally sufficient, and an appellate court
need not address the other part of the test.
Respecting the first prong of the Strickland test:
"we must indulge in the strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that
under the circumstances, the challenged action
might be considered sound trial strategy."
State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App. 511,153 P.3d 804, at P17, citing State v.
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

Respecting the second prong of Strickland, "to demonstrate
prejudice,' Defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
6

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." State v. Alfatlawi, supra at PI7, citing State v.
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426 at P55.
The harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard is reserved for
"the few context where ineffective assistance is 'presumed,' such as where
counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting the accused
during a critical stage of the proceeding, ... and where counsel is burdened
by an actual conflict of interest." State v. Alfatlawi, supra at PI 7, citing
Kimmelman v. Morrison, All U.S. 365, 381 n.6, (1986)
First, trial counsel's failure to remove a particular juror is presumed
to be the product of a conscious choice or preference." State v. Litherland,
2000 UT 76 P20, 12 P.3d 92. Second, because jury selection is" highly
subjective, judgmental, and intuitive process, trial counsel's presumable
conscious and strategic choice to refrain from removing a particular juror is
further presumed to constitute effective representation." Id. Therefore, "it
follows that the decision not to remove a particular juror need only be
plausibly justifiable, and such plausible justifiability is ordinarily
presumed." Id. At P25.
To establish that trial counsel was inattentive, Defendant must show
either "a specific and clear example of inattentiveness that directly caused
the failure to object to a particular juror, or else show that counsel generally
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failed to participate in meaningful way in the process as a whole." Id. at
P25n. 10.
Appellant argues that trial counsel's failure to object was the
deficient performance and implies that not saying anything during the voir
dire process showed indifference. But the record doesn't support that
inference. The record establishes that the Trial Court was taking the
appropriate steps to ensure Defendant received a fair trial. Under such
circumstances, it was a wise trial strategy to choose to remain silent and let
the Judge do his job, then interrupt for no reason and risk alienating the jury
pool.
To conclude juror bias, it is not appropriate to focus exclusively on a
prospective juror's initial answer over the prospective juror's whole
conversation with the court. As the Alfatlawi Court stated, "Although
Juror Ten's initial comments may have raised some questions about his or
her impartiality, the record does not show a bias" so strong or unequivocal
as to inevitably taint the trial process." P.21. The Alfatlawi court considered
the whole conversation between the prospective juror and the judge, and on
the whole, concluded there was no bias. In the instant case, the whole
conversation between prospective juror Progess and the court shows Mr.
Progess would not be biased in favor of the prosecution.
In making the determination whether the specified errors resulted in
the required prejudice, a court should presume, absent challenge to the
8

judgment on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, that the judge or jury
acted according to law.
Defendant also cannot demonstrate that the trial court's alleged error
caused prejudice. The simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to
law enforcement does not establish bias.
"Both this court and the Utah Supreme Court
have upheld denials of motions to strike law
enforcement personnel for cause when
questioning on voir dire dispels any suggestion
of bias raised by the prospective juror's law
enforcement back ground."
State v. Ramos, 882 P12d 149, 152 (Utah Ct. App 1994).
During jury selection in the instant case, the trial court asked the
prospective jurors whether any of them have close friends or family
members that work in law enforcement (R. 117:18:19-20). Prospective
juror John Richard Progess responded that he had a "close friend that's on
the Utah Highway Patrol." (R. 117:21:14-15).
The trial court asked Progess if he would "be inclined to give more
credibility to a police officer who testifies as opposed to a lay witness in
court." (R. 117:22:1-3). Progess responded, "I don't know if I'd give more
credibility, but I think they probably pay attention to detail a little bit more
than the average person." (R. 117:22:4-6).
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The trial court then inquired, "At this stage of the proceedings,
would your tendency be to favor the prosecution over the defense?" (R.
117:22:7-8). Progess responded, "No." (R. 117:22:9).
Progess' unequivocal "No." established he was not biased for the
prosecution.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984), held:,
(b) with regard to the required showing of
prejudice, the proper standard requires the
defendant to show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confine in the outcome. A court
hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider
the totality of the evidence before the judge or
jury. Pp. 691-696.
Appellant failed to address this prong of Strickland. But the record
establishes Defendant's culpability, and as such Defendant has failed to
establish that if there was an error, it was prejudicial.

10

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR BY
NOT PURSUING THE DISMISSAL OF PROSPECTIVE
JUROR PROGESS SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE OTHER
PROSPECTIVE JURORS.
In State v. Alfatlawi, 153 P.3d 804, P17, Utah App.,2006, to

establish plain error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that
was not properly objected to, a defendant must show that: (1) an error
exists; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (3) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the defendant.
"It is generally inappropriate for a trial
court to interfere with counsel's conscious
choices in the jury selection process . . . . Only
where a juror expresses a bias or conflict of
interest that is so strong or unequivocal as to
inevitably taint the trial process should a trial
court overrule trial counsel's conscious decision
to retain a questionable juror." Id.
Defendant also cannot demonstrate that the trial court's alleged error
caused prejudice. The simple fact that a potential juror may have ties to
law enforcement does not establish bias. State v. Alfatlawi, supra at p22,
State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 152 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
Rule 18 (e) (13) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure allows a challenge for cause to be
taken where a juror has "formed or expressed an
unqualified opinion or belief as whether the
defendant is guilty or not guilty." And, of
course, a juror must be willing to apply the law
as instructed by the court. nl6 These principles
are implicit in rule 18 (e) (14) of the Utah Rules
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of Criminal Procedure, which provides in part
that a challenge for cause is proper where "a
state of mind exists on the part of the juror with
reference to the cause, or to either party, which
will prevent him form acting impartially and
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the
party challenging [the juror]." "Impartiality"
has been defined as a mental attitude of
appropriate indifference. nl7
Once comments are made which facially raise a
question of partiality or prejudice, an abuse of
discretion occurs unless the challenged juror is
removed by the court or unless the court or
counsel investigates further and finds the
inference rebutted; rebuttal of such an inference
may be accomplished by a showing that the
statement was merely the product of a "light
impression" and not one that would "close the
mind against the testimony that may be offered
in opposition." nl 8
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, (UT 1988)
It is a long standing rule of law that having formed an opinion alone
will not be a basis for disqualification:
"no person shall be disqualified as a juror by
reason of having formed or expressed an
opinion upon the matter or cause to be
submitted to such jury [juror], founded upon
public rumor, statements in public journals, or
common notoriety; provided it appear to the
court, upon his declaration, under oath or
otherwise, that he can and will, notwithstanding
such an opinion, act impartially and fairly upon
the matters submitted to him. The challenge
may be oral, but must be entered in the minutes
of the court or the phonographic reporter."
(Laws 1884, p. 124.)
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, (UT 1994)
12

A defendant waives error by exercising peremptories to achieve an
impartial jury. As the authorities embraced in Menzies explain, "So long as
the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a
peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the
[Constitution] was violated." Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887). After
Menzies, "to prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a
juror for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a
member of the jury was partial or incompetent." 889 P.2d 393 (UT 1994)
As stated in Argument I, Progess' unequivocal "No" established he was
not biased for the prosecution. The Trial Court had no reason to remove
Progess.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Appellant has no bases for error, and we
respectfully request that this Court keep said judgment as is.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of April, 2007
DAVIS COUNTY ATTORNEY

Brandon L. Poll
Attorney for Appellee
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